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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 28 April 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Counterinsurgency Developments

1. Congo

Military activity has been relatively static for the last two weeks since government forces captured virtually all significant towns in the northeast. Belgian advisers to the army are formulating plans to advance west from Paulis toward the remaining sizable rebel force located in the triangle formed by Bondo, Buta, and Aketi.

There is little activity in the rebel concentration at Fizi on Lake Tanganyika, and there are no immediate plans to shift large contingents of mercenaries and Congo Army personnel to this area. The consensus in Leopoldville is that Colonel Hoare and his South African mercenaries should remain in the northeast for some time yet, while air and small-scale ground attacks keep the rebels off balance around Fizi (Map).

2. Thailand

The Communists continue to press their propaganda campaign portraying the Thai Government as a handmaiden to US "aggression" in

Southeast Asia. This line was most recently expressed in a statement by Hanoi's Foreign Ministry on 25 April attacking the Thai "authorities" for their "complicity" in permitting the US to mount air strikes against Laos and North Vietnam from Thai territory. These sentiments were echoed in a Thailand Patriotic Front statement issued in Peiping the following day which warned the Bangkok "stooges" that they would be "punished" by the Thai people.

In another development, a "representative" of the Thailand Patriotic Front was surfaced at a banquet in Peiping on 19 April, and a "liaison representative" of the Thai Independence Movement was similarly feted in Peiping on 25 March. There is no indication that formal Chinese recognition is contemplated at this time, however. The "representatives" are Thai nationals with long records of Communist affiliations. Their statements adhered closely to the general Communist propaganda line.

The Thai Government has signed a new agreement with Malaysia for cooperation against the well-entrenched Communist terrorists operating in the southern border area. The impact of the new agreement will depend largely on the attitude of the Thai. In the past, Bangkok has been more wary of Malayan influence in its four Muslimdominated southern provinces than it has been concerned over Communist subversion.

3. Laos

There has been no significant change in the military situation. The Communists continue to maintain limited pressure on government guerrilla pockets in Samneua Province and to the northwest in Phong Saly and Luang Prabang provinces. Farther south in the panhandle, where a build-up of Communist forces had been reported, there has been no significant Communist military activity.

Substantial Communist truck traffic continues to be observed on Route 23 in the panhandle despite the extensive damage to bridges in North Vietnam and the bombing of roads and Mu Gia Pass in Laos. The destination of these trucks is still not known, although some are probably moving farther south on Route 23 with supplies earmarked for eventual portage into South Vietnam.

There has been new evidence of limited Communist airdrop activity in northern Laos. As the rainy monsoon renders roads impassable, there may be an increase in aerial resupply—particularly to isolated units—but the limited number of North Vietnamese transport aircraft will preclude a major operation.

Low-level tripartite talks in Vientiane have been resumed on a weekly basis, but there is little indication that the Communists are seeking higher level talks or are pressing for a ceasefire.

The government has been unsuccessful so far in efforts to pacify the 300 mutineers ensconced north of Pak Sane. A political solution reportedly negotiated by Chief of Staff Ouan Rathikoun and Meo chief Vang Pao, who is acting as intermediary, whereby the mutineers would surrender to Meo units and would be sent to the Samneua front has not yet been effected. Leaders of the mutiny are taking a tough line demanding the return of General Phoumi to a position of authority before ending their dissidence. Government forces have had only minor skirmishes with the rebels, who reportedly are receiving support from the local population.

4. Colombia

The Communist-dominated region of El Pato, about 80 miles south of Bogota, has been subjected to an all-out attack by the Colombian Army since early April. The defenders, however, successfully avoided direct conflict with the troops, and at last report were fleeing eastward, taking with them about 800 men, women, and children as hostages.

The Colombian Army has been the target of some bad publicity lately because of a series of The escape of the El Pato bandits folfailures. lows charges by the former chief of the national police that the army's unnecessarily forceful methods against the kidnapers of former cabinet member Harold Eder were responsible for his eventual murder. Also, the army is smarting from its inability to capture bandit leader Tiro Fijo in Marquetalia, after a year of pursuit. tion, 60 Communist guerrillas are reported to have escaped a trap near the village of Simacota, which they raided on 7 January. These shortcomings may cause the Colombian Government to take another look at the army's counterinsurgency ability. The government may also consider with greater sympathy the request of the national police and the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) for larger budgets and more personnel.

5. Guatemala

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Terrorists damaged the main power line leading into Guatemala City last week in what a Guatemalan official described as a highly profes-

sional job.			

6. Venezuela

On 26 April, for the first time since 10 March, the army reported a clash with guerrillas near Maturin, the capital of Monagas. No casualties were reported.

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The three Communist couriers who were recently caught smuggling money into Venezuela probably will be deported. The Communist propaganda machinery, meanwhile, has widely broadcast denials of the party's complicity in or even foreknowledge of the smuggling attempt.





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